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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT E. CRANDALL, RICHARD
G. CRANDALL, WILLIAM H.
CRANDALL, NANCY C. TULLIS
ancl CAL VIN W. CRANDALL, dba
CRANDALL BUILDING,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.
10290

vs.
LD GARDNER,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ST ATEI\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for property damage which plaint if fr claim proximately resulted from alleged unworkmanlike plumbing services rendered by defendant to plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment
a11ading plaintiffs the sum of $1367.39, costs of court,
0 nrl interest, defendant appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of said judgment and judg.
ment in his favor as a matter of law.
'
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime between March 17, 1963, and March 22
1963, defendant, a good plumber (R. 40, 67, 78, 107),
with 16 years in the plumbing business (R. 90), installed in plaintiffs' building, the Crandall building, Salt
Lake City, Utah, ball cocks in 19 toilets in said building
(R. 87, 93), including one in the ladies' restroom on the
5th floor thereof. On the morning of June 10, 1963, at
6: 30 a.m. plaintiffs' building manager, Elmer ]. Peters
(R. 36), and plaintiffs' night watchman discovered that
a short upright pipe (about 12" to 13" in length R. 84)
which led into the ball cock unit from below, it being
one of the ball cocks defendant had installed in a toilet
in said restroom in l\1arch, was disconnected, and flow·
ing water (R. 37, 63). (This short pipe will hereafter
be referred to as the upright; it is sometimes referred
to in the transcript as a riser.) Water had not been
flowing therefrom at 10: 00 p.m. the evening before, and
no check of the building had been made between said
times ( R. 63). Thereupon, defendant was called to repair
the situation ( R. 80), and defendant's helper, Joe Cum·
mings, came and replaced the upright (R. 96), and
connected it to the ball cock unit. The said Joe Cum·
mings was a plumber's helper not a journeyman (R. 98).
The said helper testified that the replacement pipe was
of the same overall length as the upright replaced (R.
98, 101), and that he thought that after making the
I
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rt'paii he had told plaintiffs' said manager that he had
made the replacement with a stronger pipe ( R. 107).

Plaintiffs' manager testified that said helper had told him
at that time: "I put a longer pipe in this time. You
won't have no more trouble." (R. 42). He also testified
that the helper had said at that time when asked if it
would hold: "You bet. She will stay there this time."
(R 43).
The upright had been connected to the ball cock
unit by a gasket, friction ring and lock nut (R. 85). When
the said helper made the repair in June, 1963, he found
that the upright was bent and sprung Y4 inch (R. 97,101 ) . He stated that this is why he replaced the upright (R. 100) . He used an upright with a different
joint as he thought it would be better (R. 101). Cummings did not think the upright which he replaced had
been hent when the ball cock was installed in March,
1963 (R. 101). When he came in June, 1963, he found
the nut still tightly in place ( R. 99). He stated that the
pipe he replaced was not too short (R. 96).
Defendant testified in March, 1963, he put the upright into the ball cock in question as far as it would
go (R. 86). Defendant also testified that the upright
\1 as riot replaced in March (R. 79, 87), and that it had
been in perfect condition (R. 87). Plaintiffs' manager
testified that it had been replaced in March (R. 43).
Ddenclant testified that if a ball cock is properly
installed there will be no leak ( R. 86). R. D. Fereday,
8 plumbing contractor in the Salt Lake City area for
l f:i years ( R. 116) testified, as an expert witness called
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by defendant, that if such a ball cock joint installed
March 17, 1963, didn't leak before June 10, 1963, that i't
would be a good joint (R. 117,133), and that if it suddenly gave thereafter without having leaked it was his
opinion that such giving would have been caused by
an external force ( R. 118) , and that if the joint had
been bad, he believed it would have leaked right awav
(R. 119). Joseph L. Buhler, a plumbing contractor ~f
14 years experience in Salt Lake City and vicinity (2n
years as a plumber) ( R. 134) testified as an expert wit·
ness called by defendant to the same effect and in substance the same as did the said R. D. Fereday (R. 135,
136, 137), and if anything, stronger than Fereday in
favor of defendant (R. 142, 149). It was undisputed that
the ball cock joint did not leak at any time (R. 66, 79).
after installation in March 1963.
After the trial, the court made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 27, 28) and
Judgment (R. 29). Defendant was allowed a set-off of
$122.61 which plaintiffs concede was owing to defendant
(R. 165).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT NEG·
LIGENTLY AND CARELESSLY INSTALLED A
BALL COCK UNIT BY CONNECTING IT WITH
A PIPE TOO SHORT TO MAINTAIN AND HOLD
THE CONNECTION AGAINST THE NORMAL
WATER
PRESSURE
WITHIN
PLAINTIFFS
BUILDING.
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Not a scintilla of evidence.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether there is evi<knce to sustain the trial court's finding that defendant
negligently installed a ball cock unit in plaintiffs' restroom, by connecting it to a pipe too short to hold, and if
so whcdwr such negligence was the proximate cause of
property damage to plaintiffs. Defendant claims that
then' is not even a scintilla of evidence of negligence to
support the foregoing finding.
The fact that a mishap occurs, in and of itself, does
not establish negligence; negligence will not be presumed.
Quinn v. Gas and Coke Co. 42 Utah 113, 129 Pac. 362
( 1912).
The evidence in the record concerning the length
of the pipe is in favor of defendant, except it is true
that plaintiffs' building manager testified that defendant's
helper, Joe Cummings, after having repaired the toilet
in June, 1963, said: "I put a longer pipe in this time.
You won't have no more trouble." And also: "You bet.
She will stay there this time." The witness, at the trial,
cknir-rl that he put in a longer pipe.
The alleged statement in one sense is nothing more
than a simple statement of fact that he had used a
longer pipe, and of a conjecture that it would hold in
the future, however, even if we permit an inference
from it that ha<l a longer pipe been used before there
would have been no separation, it does not help plaintiffs' case. The very most that this shows is causation.
Proof of causation alone does not impose liability on
clt'frndant unless he is an insurer, and of course he is
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not. Defendant is not liable unless he was also negligent.
Negligence is a violation of a standard of care. The
standard of care for a plumber is that he shall perform
his work in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike man.
ner in accordance with the accepted standards in thi~
locality for such work by plumbers, and to do said worK
with the degree of skill and care which generally prevails in this locality for plumbers. A violation thereof
would be of negligence. See Fritz v. Western Union, 2i
Utah 263, 71 P. 209. See also Sec. 54.8 J.I.F.U. The stan·
<lard is thus essentially the same as that applied to physi·
cians and surgeons. Of course, a plumber, just as a
physician and surgeon would be, should be held to thr
usual standard of the reasonably prudent man in mam
areas of conduct, but the higher standard of conduct Ii
required of him with regard to his specialty. However.
at the same time, although a higher degree of skill is
required of him, since an understanding of conduct with
regard to that specialty involves knowledge not possessed by a layman, expert testimony should be required
to show negligence just as it is in the medical field.
It is stated in Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed. at page 134:
"Since juries composed of laymen are r.1or·
mally incompetent to pass judgment on quest10ns
of medical science or technique, it has been held
in a great majority of malpractice cases that thw
can be no finding of negligence in the absence o!
expert testimony to support it."
This is the rule in Utah with regard to technical
medical matters. Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 259, 209
P. 2nd 566 ( 1949), Coon v. Shields, 88 Utah 76, 39
P. 2d 348 (1934).
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In the present case the only evidence of the stand;n d rrqun cd of clefrndant, as it bears upon the length
of pipe, is that of defendant's witnesses who uniformly
state in effect that a pipe is long enough if the joint
dorsn 't leak. There is no evidence whatsoever that dekndant violation that standard. He clearly met it. Defendant's helper, Joe Cummings, was certainly not an expert
as far as the record shows. The most that can be said
for him is that he was a plumber's helper from March,
1%3 until June, 1963, when he allegedly made the
\tatcment. He was not even a journeyman plumber.
HO\n·ver, even if he were an expert, his statement would
not be evidence on the question of standard of care
1 cquired of a plumber in this situation. At most, it would
be a statement that in his opinion defendant was negli.gent for using a shorter pipe than the situation called for.
The alleged statement of the helper, Joe Cummings,
means in effect, at most, that if the pipe had been
longer in the first place, it would have held. Since he
was not present at the time that the said upright became
separated from the ball cock unit, he could not know of
his own knowledge why it came apart, and therefore his
~tatement is at best an opinion. And, of course, it is
often easy to see after an act is done, that it would have
l)rcn better to do it in another way, but that is not the
issue. The issue is, was defendant negligent at the time
he did the work. The court is not allowed to compare
one expert opinion against another on the question of
rwgligcnce. The court can only arrive at a finding of
negligence by comparison of defendant's conduct with
that of plumbers in the community generally. Coon v.
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Shields, supra. Even if the record contained a direct
statement by an expert plumber, that the pipe was too
short and that it should have been done differently to
begin with, this would not be evidence of negligence.
Also, the court cannot substitute its own expert
knowledge of plumbers and plumbing (R. 42, 67, 86,
128, 163) in place of expert testimony, and cannot
take judicial notice of the standard of a plumber in the
community on a technical subject. The court, of course.
knows that defendant will be negligent unless he lives
up to the standard generally of plumbers in this area.
but he cannot take judicial knowledge of what plumbers
generally in the area would do in a particular case, despite his own individual knowledge. If this were allowed,
how could this court review the matter of the judge's
"expert knowledge" as there is nothing in the record to
show it? If we were only concerned with the reasonable
prudent man test, the judge as a finder of fact would,
of course, determine whether defendant met that standard, but he cannot substitute himself in the place of an
expert witness, even though he may be familiar with the
subject, to determine how an expert should handle a
technical subject.
2.

No substantial evidence.

Even if the court should hold that the alleged state·
ment of defendant's helper is some evidence, it is not
substantial evidence, and is no more than a mere scintilla
of evidence.
At the trial, respondent, as plaintiff, had the bur·
den of affirmatively showing defendant's negligence b)
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·;ubslantial evidence. Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah
2d :287. '.)'.)1 P. 2d 430 (1964). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co. 121
l_ltah 61, 239 P. 2d 174 ( 1951). Thus, although the
Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court, nor even weigh the evidence, the court
must review the evidence to see if there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court's findings, even if there
is a scintilla of evidence.
In Seybold vs. Union Pac. R. Co., supra, one of the
issues presented was whether there was substantial evidence that a certain caboose was unlighted at the time
of the accident. The only evidence that it was not lighted
was that of plaintiff who testified that he didn't notice
any lights on it when he saw it just before it collided
with the vehicle he was driving. This court felt that
plaintiff had only "an extremely limited and fleeting
opportunity" to observe for lights. The court in effect
held that to constitute substantial evidence it must be
"reasonable to suppose he would have observed." The
court furth~r stated at page 67:

"Considering the limited opportunity plaintiff had to observe, it can hardly be said in fairness
that his evidence was substantial. Contrasted with
the testimony of other witnesses who had adequate
opportunity for observation and especially that
of the two disinterested witnesses who saw lights
on the caboose from their vantage point, it seems
to us that it would be unreasonable to make a
finding that there were no lights on the caboose."
Thus, it appears that the court's decision was based
on two grounds: 1) that the overwhelming testimony
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was in the other direction, namely that the caboos,,
'·Was
lighted (particularly since much of it was disinterested)
and 2) the court seemed to feel that there was doub;
that plaintiff had had a satisfactory opportunity to see
whether the caboose was lighted or not.
Although the Seybold case, supra, dealt with a pure
question of fact, the reasoning there is equally applicable
to the present case concerning the alleged statement of
defendant's helper, Joe Cummings, although his state·
ment is an opinion.
The overwhelming testimony, of three experts, two
of whom were disinterested, was that the connection
was good; the only other possible evidence is the sairl
disputed statement of the helper. The qualifications of
this helper were never shown and there is thus, consider·
able doubt as to his ability to render an opinion as to
whether defendant was negligent or as to what caused
the separation. We thus, have the same situation as the
said Seybold case, to-wit: overwhelming testimony to
the contrary, disinterested witnesses to the contrary, and
doubt as to the ability to observe (know) on the part of
the declarant. All we know from the record is that the
helper worked as a helper for about three months, at
the time he allegedly made the statement, we don't
know how long he worked before that time. (It is in·
teresting also to note that the statement of the helper at
the time of trial, namely that the pipe was not too short,
would actually be more valuable than his statement in
June ' 1963 ' because we at least know that he had that
much more experience upon which to base such a state·
ment.)
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Abo, it 'lccms doubtful that defendant's helper, Joe
Cumrnrngs, ever made the statement attributed to him.
Fir~t of all, he disputed and denied that he made the
\tatCincnt, and stated that the pipe which he used as a
rcplaccrncnt was exactly the same length. Second, there
(lppcared to be no reason why defendant would have
replaced th<' upright which he found in place in March
\i·ith a shorter one. It is difficult to suppose that the
ckfrnclant would remove an upright which was apparently ~atisfactory and replace it with a shorter one
~mcl thereby risk an unsatisfactory connection. Third, it
seems very doubtful that the building manager ever
examined the upright after the repair work in March
so as to be able to say whether defendant had replaced
it. Defendant worked on 19 toilets in the building and, it
is Yery doubtful that said manager would go through 19
of them an<l look to see if defendant had changed any
risc'rs. That he ever observed whether the defendant
changed the upright in question in March is very doubtful. Whether he observed that a new riser was installed
in March is a pure question of fact, and falls directly
\1ithin the Seybold case, supra, as being a doubtful ob~cn'<l ti on.

The case of Jackson v. Colston, supra, involved a
claim for damages for the alleged burning by means of
certain lamps of plaintiff's leg during weight reducing
treatrrwnts by defendants. The trial court directed a
verdict for defendants and this court affirmed. Among
other thmg;s, appellant contended that an alleged admissinn 1. :as sufficient evidence to make a case for the jury.
Plaintiff claimed that the admission was made by one
uf the defrndants about 3 months after plaintiff's last
1
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treatment as follows: "Oh, yes, we have burned you ad
n
I am sorry. ,, T he Supreme Court held that said de.
fendant "did not possess the qualifications necessary 1
determine the cause of ... (plaintiff's) injury." Ther~
was a dissent in the case, but no reference is made in
the dissent to the matter of admission, and it seems tn
be based on other grounds. Just as in the Jackson case
supra, an alleged admission was held to be insufficien;
evidence on the issue of causation, to make a question
of fact, for the reason that the declarant lacked the
necessary qualifications (which is the same as saying
because his qualifications were not shown) so in the
present case the alleged statement of defendant's said
helper is insufficient evidence of claimed negligence 01
defendant as well as of the issue of causation. The qualifications of the said helper to testify with regard to
standard of care of plumbers in this vicinity was never
shown nor were his qualifications to testify with regard
to the technical issues of pipe joint stresses, water pressure, etc., as those matters bear upon causation. The
said helper doubtless had some knowledge as a helper,
and no doubt the said defendant in the Jackson case had
some knowledge of the effect of said defendant's lamp
upon human flesh. But just as sufficient specific quaJifi.
cations of the said defendant in the Jackson case, with
regard to that particular technical subject, were 1101
adequately shown, so, too, in the present case, the qualifications of the helper with regard to the technicai
questions involved in this case have never been shown.
3.

Res ipsa loquiter not applicable.

The trial court seemed to feel that the defendant
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had the burden to show why the pipe became disconnected, and that if he couldn't meet this burden, he
was liable. The court said at page 164 of the record:
,, ... I can't believe that there is any basis at all for
saying that vandalism caused the thing to come out. I
think the thing speaks for itself, that is was negligently
constructed if there was not vandalism ... "
The only way defendant could have the burden of
,,xplaining the accident is if the doctrine of res ipsa
!oquiter applies. In using the phrase "the thing speaks
for itself" the court seems to be relying on that doctrine.
This case, of course, doesn't involve an instrumentality
within the control of defendant, nor was the doctrine
ever raised as an issue. It has no application in this case.
The court thus, was not justified in casting the
burden of proof onto defendant.
In using the phrase, ". . . it was negligently constructed if there was not vandalism . . ." the court was
clearly in error. If defendant was negligent, he was
negligent when he did the work in March. Vandalism
will not change that. Vandalism has a bearing only on
causation, as it would be an intervening cause. Thus,
the court seems to feel that negligence has been established by the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter. Such is not
the case.

4.

Equal inferences rule.

Finally, even if plaintiffs' evidence survives the foregoing objections, then certainly no more can be said for
it, than that it points equally to two causes. One, that
the riser was short and two that an external force was
'
'
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applied against it. It is well settled in this state that
where the plaintiff seeks to prove an allegation bi
inference sought to be deduced from proven facts and
the evidence so deduced points with equal force to
several inferences, only one of which would render the
defendant liable, then plaintiff has not sustained his
case. Quinn v. Utah Gas and Coke Company, supra.
POINT 2. THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES
NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS
SUSTAINED PROPERTY DAMAGE AS THE m.
RECT AND PROXIMATE RESULT OF SAID ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE.
In Section 1 of Point 1, supra, defendant has dernonstra ted that plaintiffs' case must fail because of plaintiffs' failure to prove negligence, even if he had proved
causation.
In Section 2, of Point 1, supra, defendant has shown
that plaintiffs have failed to prove negligence by substantial evidence (even if a scintilla of evidence has
been shown) . The same arguments there set forth to
show lack of sufficient evidence to prove negligence also
demonstrate the lack of sufficient evidence of causation
and in fact, defendant has at times in discussing Point
1 briefly referred to the matter of causation. Defendant.
of course, adopts those arguments, but does not repeal
them here at length, as it would serve no useful purpose.
except it may be emphasized that the case of Jacks01~ 1·
Colston supra since it deals directly with the quest10n
of causation, is particularly applicable here and compc 11
the conclusion that the defendant's helper is not sho1111
to be sufficiently expert to prove why the pipe joint 11 a~
)

)

I
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found cli~connccted. It goes without saying that the doctrien of res ipsa loquiter discussed in Section 3 of Point
1 has no application to causation, and can be of no help
to plaintiffs' case.
The argument contained in Section 4 of Point 1 is
rf(lffirmf'd in connection with Point 2.

CONCLUSION
It thus appears that plaintiffs' have failed to produ.-J: even a scintilla of evidence that defendant was
nrgligent, and certainly failed to show substantial evidrnce of any negligence on the part of defendant and
that anv such negligence was the proximate cause of any
damage to plaintiffs. The judgment of the trial court
should be reversed with directions to enter judgement
against plaintiffs, no cause for action, and to enter judgement for defendant upon his amended counterclaim for
$122.61, interest and costs.
Respectfully submitted,
William G. Shelton
Robert C. Cummings
314 Atlas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for
Def endant-Appellant

